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During the last decade or so politicians and bureaucrats
of the welfare state have been faced with ever increasing prob-
lems. Some of the predominant challenges confronting the
guardians of the welfare state are growing expenditures. mount-
ing awareness of the complexity of giving adequate medical and
social services. rigidities of organizational solutions and dimin-
ishing backing in the population in favor of the welfare state.
The literature on crises in the welfare state, by the welfare
state and 0/ the welfare state iUustrates the problems and
provides the academic framework for analysis of the situation
(although the notion of crisis is severely challenged by several
authors).
The welfare tate is a relatively new social phenomenon
and there are no precedents, neither for the problems that have
emerged, nor for the solutions available. When confronted
with problems the development so far seems to have been a
return to solutions of the past. In aU kinds of welfare states
the tendency has been to call again upon the market forces
and reduce state intervention, to shift health and social pro-
grammes from the public to the private sector and upgrade the
role of the family, to return centralized responsibilities to the
local communities, and to emphasize selective measures at the
expense of universal welfare state programmes. It looks like
these" solutions" have swept all over the world. regardless of
the size and content of the problems they are intended to
solve. "The demands for these measures have been set for·
ward independent of the degree of development of the welfare
state or the colour of the political party in power. They have
also been forwarded independent of whether economic dif·
ficulties have penetrated the national economies or only touched
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upon the fringes, whether state intervention and bureaucratic
responsibility arc extensive or limited, and whether national
unemployment rates are unusually high or moderate" (0 yen,
1986: 10). The picture is such that questions can be raised
as to the logical relationship between the solutions offered and
the problems the welfare state is facing.
In the following we shall take a closer look at one of
these solutions, namely decentralization, and analyze different
political strategies involved in obtaining this goal.
J . Decentralization as a solution
Decentralization takes many forms, and the empirical
evidence of the effect of different kjnds of decentralization in
the welfare state is scarce. Decentralization is usually seen as
the shifting of responsibility for a certain program or problem
from a higher to a lower administrative level. The legitimat-
ing force behind the demands for increased decentralization is
a perceived need for more democracy and local authority, to be
achieved through shorter links between administration and con-
sumers. As in the early works of Himmelstrand it is stressed
that the transmission of information, choice and influence on
decision making are essential factors for the functioning of an
«ideal" democracy (Himmelstrand, 1960: 206-210). But im-
portant elements in demanding change through more decentral-
ization are also conflicts over the control of resources and the
organization, power struggles between different professional
groups concerning their relationship to the consumers, and a
seept ieism of the role of the state and the central bureaucracy
as providers of welfare services.
Britain can here serve as a case demonstrating the ongoing
discussion on decentralization. But Hungary, for example,
could just as easily be brought fotward as a case (Verebelyi,
1986), in order to show the universality of the discussion.
Social scientists strongly disagree as to the value of shifting
the responsibility for social programs from the central level to
the periphery. It is generally accepted that there is a need for
more efficient social services, that the delivery of services should
be more human, and that services in cash and kind should be
more fairly distributed. But while there seems to be some
unity as to the goals to be achieved, it seems more difficult to
reach a joint position on the diagnosis of the problems and the
adequate strategies to be promoted. The dilemma is shared
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by socialist politicians who are divided between the supporters
of the traditional centralized welfare state and the supporters
of "new egalitarianism" who see a renewal of socialism through
increased decentralization (Fudge, 19 -ll.
Hambleton and Hoggerr are among those British social
scientists advancing the notion that, given certain organizational
conditions, decentralization below the administrati\'e lewI of
the municipality c<ln be seen as an instrument for achieving
necessary and long overdue changes in the welfare state. Besides
improving the quality of the welfare services, dec ntraliz:Hion
in their view forces the welfare sen' ices to become more need-
based and equitable, because the visibility of the services also
make them more accountable to the public. Thev sec the
political awareness in the community mounting as people's sense
of ownership of the services increases, thereby winning public
support for the collective provisions of local services (Hambleton
and Hoggerr, 1984: 1-13). The argument is carried further
when it is maintained that another objective of decentraliza-
tion is to become a challenge to the existing professionalized
welfare state apparatus (ibid. 28), and to break the monopoly
control of state professional production (ibid. 29).
Pinker is one of the exponents fot those social scientists
who sees increasing decentralization as undermining the very
nantte of the welfare state. He is aware of the many anomalies
created by a centralized bureaucracy but argues that further
decentralization, without a universalistic framework, will crente
anomalies that are even harsher on those who depend the most
on the welfare state. The closer the professionals, as well as
the non-professionals, come to the clients, the more likely it is
that personal characteristics of the clients, and not the need
of the clients, will influence the judgement of those in charge.
The acceptance of universalistic principles are at the core of the
welfare state, and extended decentralization combined with
discretion is a threat to equity. The state, and the distance
between the givers and receivers, are so far the best guarantees
for a socially and geographicaJly fair distribution of benefits
(Pinker, 1982).
2. How much decentralization?
The patchwork approach to decentralization goes even
further in dissolving the relationship to established ad-
ministrative units, when decomposing the target population for
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the services into small "patches" of 100-500 household which
are located in geographical and social proximity. The linkage
to the grassroots is emphasized through the recruitment of
personnel in and by the community (Hardie, 1986).
The example illustrates the point that there is no natural
numerical point at which it can be said that the process of
decentralization has been completed. The onJy logical stopping
point for the "botton up" approach is the single individual.
There is no scientific evidence which can solve the classical
choice between centralization and decentralization. Whatever
organizational form is chosen there are inherent gains and
losses, sometimes for the same groups, sometimes for different
groups or society at large (Rupel, 1988). The issues touch upon
such basic questions as the democratic forms and the collective
rights versus the individual rights of the citizens. Therefore,
the choice between centralization and decentralization becomes
a matter of political and moral decisions, and not just a matter
of social engineering. Once these decisions have been made, in
principle decentraJized organizations can be tailored to the
goals to be obtained.
Three of the small and well established welfare states can
serve as examples of different ways of facing the dilemmas
involved in decentralization as solutions to pending problems.
Norway, Denmark and New Zealand are among those welfare
states where cautious decentralization has aimed at transferring
a Iimi ted number of social programs and competence from the
central and county level to the municipal level, the so-called
1st decentralization (Prahl et aI., 1988: 15-33). Some of the
latger municipalities in turn have carried this development into
still smaller geographical units for delivering social services,
or have placed the responsibility with ethnic groups or minority
groups to be served, the so-called 2nd decentralization. The
state is carrying part of the expenses for the programs, and the
tendency is towards the use of block grants instead of earmarked
grants, and an increasing transfer of the financial burden and
control to the periphery. The reasoning in favor of intensify-
ing decentralization is the same in all three countries. The
value of local democracy, better response to individual needs,
and more flexibility in organizational accomodation to the
community in order to produce efficient and cost saving units,
are vital parts of the legitimating arguments (Kjellberg,
1989: 4).
The arguments produce a mixed bag of ideological and
financial goals to be pursued (Kuhnle, 1980). Denmark and
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ew Zealand are among tho e countries that have e.xperienced
severe financial constraints on the welfar estate, and this is
reflected in the discussion. oTWay may now be heading for
the same development, and lately financial arguments have come
into focus there as well. Common for the three countries i
the explicit call for extended involvement of the citizens in
the social programs, the so-called 3rd decentralization. This
phenomenon can be interpreted in at least three ways. On
the one hand the invitation to more involvement can be seen
as a democratizing measure, trying to close the gap berween
the information-rich and the information-poor ( zecsko, 1986:
438). On the other hand new ideas have penetrat d large
segments of the informed public, calling for individuals to take
more responsibiliry for their own wellbeing, aquire knowledge
which was formerly reserved for the welfare profession and
to engage actively in preventive work and influence the content
of social programs. A third interpretation is of a more financial
nature, as privatization, deinstitutionalization and transfer of
welfare activities to voluntary agencies become instruments for
shilting the economy from the public to the private arena.
Common for the sentiment in the three welfare states is
also a pronounced need for more precise knowledge about the
functioning of the social programs and the situation at the
"grassroot n level. While the gap berween those providing
the services and the consumers may not actually have widened,
the need for information in order to produce more rational
decisions has certainly increased. The immense costs of the
programs make it pertinent to the bureaucracy to secure infor-
mation which allows an evaluation of the investments. The
sizeable number of potential voters benefitting from the pro-
grams makes it just as important to the politicians to evaluate
the success of the programs. But few of the programs have
been constructed in such a way as to give continuous and con-
sistent feedback about the actual functioning of the program,
the distribution of the services and the coverage of needs.
However, the three countries have chosen different profiles
in their striving to mobilize local problem solving.
The Norwegian approach has been rather loyal to the
existing administrative structure, and innovations have mainly
been linked to the establishment. The decentralizing measures
have not only been geographical, but have included transfers
of competence as well as delegation of decision-making.
Although the actual shift of programs to the local level has in-
creased, the ties between central and local authorities are
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traditionally so intertwined and manyfold that it is difficult to
sort Ollt the power relations between the different administrative
levels (Strand, 1985: 17), The Norwegian Ministry of Con-
sumer Affairs and Government Administration initiated a
general scheme aimed at providing better access to public
services, including welfare services, and the Ministry of Social
Affairs followed up, Social scientists have been invited to
review social programs, evaluate alternative organizational
solutions and provide data for decisionmaking, based on the
experience of the consumers, New channels of appeal and
feedback have been established, such as an ombudsman for health
services on the county level. And built into social legislation
is a provision which gives room for experimentation with new
social programs and extensive discretion, A key word to
understanding the development is consumer participation (NOU:
38, 1988),
Denmark has gone through somewhat of the same develop-
ment as Norway, but during the last couple of years it has chosen
a more experimental path, Underlying the change of direction
is among other things a disillusionment with social scientists
who have failed to develop adequate research results to help
the politicians and bureaucrats sort out the political and moral
dilemmas embedded in the welfare state, This goes hand in
hand with the call for debureaucratization set forward by
the Conservative government, and the call for better control
with the professions, set forward by the bureaucracy, In 1988
Parliament granted 50 million d,kr" and another 100 million
d,kr. for each of the following three years, to be earmarked for
local initiatives in the social sector, Individuals or groups of
citizens, voluntary organizations and local administrations are
invited to come forward with projects that can further new
solutions to social problems or have a positive impact on
preventive work, As examples are mentioned activities for
very young children, help to families in a difficult situation,
and care for the elderly, handicapped, immigrants or those
who are permanently institutionalized, The idea is to involve
more people in problems concerning their everyday life and to
make use of the experience of lay people, It is specifically
stated that projects transgressing administrative and professional
borders are given priority, since it is important to break
down traditional administrative procedures (Socialministeriets
udviklingsmidler, 1988), In short, social problems are no
longer to be seen as the property of the professions or the
social administration, The Ministry of Social Affairs is
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re ponsible for the allocation of funds, thereby shortculting the
distance between the centre and the periphery, and undermin-
ing the power base for the local social administration. The
social scientists are also being bypa sed, in particular those at
the government financed instirute for applied social research
where for many years the ministry has commissioned its
research.
3. Consulting the people
ew Zealand has gone even further in experimenting with
the bottom-up approach, hereby creating new flows of informa-
tion between users and decision-makers which is unique for the
modern welfare state and opens up for hitherto unknown in-
novations in social policy-making. It is the kind of experimenl
which may move future ethical and moral boundaries. BUI il
is also a decentralizing strategy which is challengin/!, the entin'
political and aministrative organization 01 thf' New Zealand
welfare state (0yen, 1988).
In 1986 the New Zealand Labour Prime Minister, David
Lange, took the initiative to establish a Royal Commission on
Social Policy which was to review the entire ew Zealand
welfare state through extensive consultation with the people
(Terms of reference, 1986). The rationale behind the establish-
ment of the commission was many-sided. The Labour govern·
ment had a new election coming up the following year, the
outcome of which was uncertain. By making crucial social
policy issues visible and involving the many potential voters
in the discussion, the government stressed its commitment to
the welfare state as well as to democratic procedures in policy-
making. This fitted well with the early images of Lange as a
humane politician concerned with social issues, and the Prime
Minister himself tailored the terms of reference for the com-
mISSIon. At the outset the commission was seen by govern-
ment not only as a political instrument, but also as an instru-
ment for economic reforms. The New Zealand economy was
having difficulties and increasing social expenditures were
brought forward as one of the main reasons for the halting
economy. Thtough the work of the commission it was believed
possible to find measures for distributing welfare benefi ts more
efficiently and curbing expenses.
The terms of reference stated that the commission "will
inquire into the extent to which existing instruments of policy
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meet the needs of New Zealanders, and report on what fun-
damental or significant changes are necessary or desirable in
existing policies, administration, institutions or systems to
secure a more fair, humanitarian, consistent, efficient and
economical social policy ... ". The commission will report on
"The extent to which New Zealand meets the standards of a
fair society and the main reasons New Zealand falls short of
any of these standards" and "Any associated matter that may
be thought by the Commission to be relevant to the general
objects of the enquiry" (Terms of reference, 1986).
At a press conference the Prime Minister elaborated on
the terms of reference. The following points are of particular
interest here. The background for the task of the commission
was set against the changing financial situation of New Zealand
and the need for economic growth. The power of the com-
mission was stressed by saying there were no limits in the
commission's capacity to suggest that future resources be used
in different ways, and that the work of the commission was
beyond the political process. The goal for a fair society was
kept vague, but delimited to be a society free of inflation and
unemployment, and using the concept of genuine opportunity
instead of equality of opportunity. The term well-being within
the community and the need for a cohesive society were other
indicators of a fair society (Statement by Prime Minister, 7
august 1986; Press conference by Prime Minister, 7 august
1986).
In a widely distributed brochure about the aims of the
commission the Prime Minister stated that the government
must listen to the commission, as the commission must listen
to the citizens, and people were invited to make written and
spoken submissions. The goals for a fairer society in the future
were spelled out, and now included education, housing, access
to medical services, and a social policy" which is not just about
the problems of the disadvantaged". But into the brochure
warnings were also written. "Some of our goodwill towards
the welfare state is close to being exhausted", and" some of it
no longer serves its purpose". "We face new pressures" and
"Social policy and economic policy cannot be separated" (A
fairer future, 1986).
In the terms of ,'eference it was laid down that the com-
mission shall consult widely with the community, including
Maoris, ethnic and other social groups, and adopt procedures
which encourage people to participate with inputs into the
work of the commission. The commission was also expected
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to draw upon relevant findings and experience from govern-
ment departments, advisory committees, task forces of different
kinds, and "independent" researchers. In the statement by
the Prime Minister it was said expres ly that the commission
should go broader and deeper in its consultation than my
other royal commission had done before, reaching out to the
ordinary people.
The commission pledged to gather a many views as pos-
sible. In the first ne\vsletter from the conl111ission it \VAS
stressed rhat the commission must discover as far as it Cltn
what the widest cross-section of New Zealanders feel they need.
In short, every citizen who could voice an opinion was asked
to give the commission feedback. In the first newsletter the
commission speUed out the expectations and invited people to
come forward with what they felt was right and wrong with
present programmes and what their concerns were. Concrete
experiences with social programmes were at the core of the
matter, but views about a future path for the New Zealand
welfare state, ideas about a new scheme for disability pensions
or barriers to further education were considered just as relevant.
Since the goal for the work of the commission had been widely
defined at the outset, the submissions were expected to cover as
wide a range. In the second newsletter a submission was
simply defined as letting the commission know what a person
thinks must be done to achieve a more just society than the
one at preseot.
4. Channels of feedback
The commission spent more than one million New Zealand
dollar in public relations to arrange meetings in the communities,
facilitate grassroot-networking, advise groups on how to make
submissions and feed media. In order to foUow up the inten-
tions of having as many in the population as possible participate
in the work of the commission several channels for individual
as well as corporate and formalized inputs were organized.
The main office for the commission was placed in WeUing-
ton, with another office located in Auckland. The staff included
consultants with particular responsability for liaison with
Maoris, members of the Pacific Island community and disabled
persons, as these groups were seen as being in need of special
assistance in order to further their views. But the staff was
available for all kinds of inquiries and inputs.
In order to provide more direct access to the members of
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the commiSSion twO rounds of public meetings were arranged
in the local communities for people to meet with the commis-
sioners. The itinerary for the meetings which were held all
over New Zealand was published well ahead. At the first
round of meetings approximately 4000 people attended the
public hearings, while «hundreds of thousands" were re-
presented through umbrella and national organizations (News-
Jetter No.1, 1987). Written and oral submissions coud be
put before the commission at the meetings, but also presented
privately to one of the commissioners. In addition the com-
missioners consulted other groups, such as trade unions,
women's groups and Maoris.
An elaborate system of submissions was developed where-
by the commisison accepted not only written submissions, but
also acknowledged messages recorded on tape, as well as those
presented orally at a public meeting or at an informal meeting
attended by commissioners. The submissions could be on a
single issue or on a whole range of issues which at a later stage
would be sorted out. Earlier submissions to other royal com-
missions or other public agencies were also welcomed, as were
statements concerning social issues which had been brought
forward in another context. Submissions could be made by
individuals, or on behalf of individuals, as well as by any
kinds of groups, public or private organizations. A fund was
available for assisting individuals and groups to prepare sub-
missions, making sure that financial inequalities were not
mirrored in the kind of submissions presented.
A freephone for women was established, where women
were encouraged to give their submissions directly over the
phone. Government departments and larger institutions were
invited LO submit papers on particular issues, stating what they
thought were the most important matters to be considered by
the commission. Papers came not only from the ministries
on social welfare, health and women's affairs, but also from
the ministry on energy. Researchers were contracted ro do
projects on problems related to the different aspects of the
commission's area of responsibility, although the researchers
were pulled into the process only at a later stage of the con-
sultations.
The deadline for 3ubmissions was December 1987, and by
rhen do e to six thousand submissions had been presented.
While it had been expected that the structure of the feedback
channels might favor the strongest interest groups, the first
analysis of the submissions showed a different picture. The
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well of middle cia s, the busine s communiry and the employer-.
the far right and the farmers formed a ilent m.ljority which
apparently wa underrepresented in the submissions. One
hypothesi is that they did not perceive the activities of the
Roval Commission as rele\'ant for their situation. Another
hypothesis is that they felt their interests were being l.Iken
care of in another arena (0yen, ibid.).
5. Setting the agenda
The ultimate receiver of the feedback was to be the
Cabinet. The commission had been given the mandate to
receive the submissions, select them, sort them and fit Ihem
into new patterns before a final report was presentcd to govern-
ment. 0 formal guidelines had been established as to how
the information was to be selected. On the contrary. Ihe com-
mission had been publicly announced as having a frec hand
and expected not to let itself be tied down by trivialities.
At the outset the commission had five members. ami laler
was added a sixth member. The Prime Minister had pcrsunally
endorsed their appointment, but lists of nominees for the com-
mission had been circulated in political groups and thc bureau-
cracy beforehand, and the final choice of members was a result
of a series of compromises. The members were supposed to
represent the grassroots, in accordance with the populist trend
in Labour at the time of bringing ordinary people back into
politics, and none of the members were to be recruiled among
academic social policy experts.
It took a while before the commission had sorted out the
concrete tasks in the terms of reference and decided on the di-
rections for coming strategies. Although the deadline for the
final report gave the commission only until June 1988 (later
extended to September 1988) for completing a report, the general
sentiment in the political milieu was implying a different time
schedule. The future life of the commission depended on the
outcome of the elections in Au~st 1987. II Labour were
returned to power the commission could expect to continue its
work and receive the necessary funding. If the Oppusition
won the election the commission would likely have becn aban-
doned. Cllt short of funds or reorganized. No doubt the pro-
gress of the commission was slowed down. not only by Ihe
formidable task ahead. but also by the uncertain outcome of the
votes to be cast by the ew Zealanders.
As it turned out, David Lange was brought back into power
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with 4(, per cent of the votes and a majority of 15 seats in
parliament. The work to be achieved by the commission was
used actively in the political campaign by Labour prior to the
ejections, and media coverage of issues drawn from the terms
of reference was widespread.
Expectations in the political milieu were still that the
deadline for the commission would be postponed. It was be-
coming (jllite evident that the task of the commission was larger
than that of any other royal commission before, and the present
deadline looked unrealistic. If deferred further, the new dead-
line would approach the next elections in 1990, and the work
of the commission could once more be used successfully in the
political campaign of the Labour party.
During the campaign prior to the elections it had become
evident that the public interest in the issues raised by the com-
mission was far more pervasive than the politicians could have
suspected when first bringing the matter forward. The idea of
letting the people speak for themselves about their own concrete
future was catching on, not only at the organizational level, but
also at the grassroot level. Ordinary people were grasping the
unique opportunity to voice their opinion on all those everyday
matters of quali ty of life they were unhappy about, in their own
words and on their own terms, without having to abstract them
into bureaucratic or political terms. Evidently the setting of
the agenda was moving into new hands.
6. Scrambling for control
To the politicians the success of their initiative was under·
mining their own influence on the outcome of the enquiry.
The need for government to control the social policy agenda was
closely linked to the ongoing economic policies. In spite of a
certain economic growth the lew Zealand economy was under
pressure and the Lange government was forced to put into ef-
fect harsh financial measures for reshaping budgets, cutting ex-
penditures and attacking unemployment figures getting close to
eight per cent. The move was increasingly towards larger ac-
ceptance of the influence of market forces, the so-called Roger-
nomics (after the Minister of Finance Roger Douglas and Rea-
ganomics). The rural sector was the first to be restructured.
So far the welfare budgets had mostly been left alone, but the
many calls for expanding social programs which came through
during the campaign, must have been very alarming for the
architects of economic reforms. If they were to suceed it was
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vital to gain control over the most costly issues in the material
collected by the commission.
The commission itself eemed beyond control. Along the
way it became very dedicated to the task at hand and simply
went on with its itinerary of public meetings, consult:ltions Rnd
publications as planned. Like the politicians the commission
was stimulated by the extensive response by the public and
escalated its activities in order to mobilize still larger segments
of the population. For the left wing of the Labour party the
commission became the focal point for resistance against the
economic policies called for by the right wing of the party.
The first kind of control to be introduced in the commission
was the e tablishment of a committee on Social Equity which
was to sort out the important issues, filter the information and
bridge the conflicts before a final report was presented to the
Cabinet. The chair was the Deputy Prime Minister. and mem-
bers of the committee were the Prime Minister, the Minister of
Finance, and other members of Cabinet - who in their own
due time were to report to themselves.
Another way of tightening the controls and diluting the
content of the final report from the commission was the esta-
blishment of 17 working parties which were to review not only
the report, but were to add any other material of relevance for
social policy issues. The bureaucracy was eager to have its say.
Two substantial reports on delivery of social services (Ministe-
rial Task Force on Social Services, July 1987 and September
1987) and income maintenance (Ministerial Task Force on So-
cial Services, July 1987 and September 1987) and income main-
tenance (Ministerial Task Force on Income Maintenance, De-
cember 1987) had already been produced, independently of the
commission, and the conclusions were not in line with the
material collected by the comrnisison. The agenda was firmly
set by giving the different working parties responsibility for
well defined and limited areas, such as income maintenance,
social services, housing, etc. Members of the working parties
were mainly drawn from the bureaucracy, and they were sup-
posed to act independently of their ministers.
The legitimacy for establishing the working parties was
the need for coordinating the many different views and the
preparation of more coherent reports that the commission would
be able to do. The hidden agenda was the introduction of a
whole new game where power over social policy issues was
transferred back to the bureaucracy and the politicians.
Another hard blow to the commission came in December
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17, 1987 when the Minister of Finance issued an economic
statement concerning new tax reforms which preempted the
work of the commission. If implemented, the tax reforms
would have a larger impact on the quality of life of the less
well off New Zealanders than any recommendation the commis-
sion could come up with. The radical wing within the Labour
party immediately denounced the new rogernomics, and me
head of New Zealand's Roman Catholic Church named me
government as "heartless and inhuman".
Apparently the Prime Minister had nor been consulted
when the economic statement was presented on "white paper"
instead of "green paper". i.e. as a statement from Cabinet
instead of a discussion paper. Whether this is true or not is
of little importance here. The point is that the commission was
seen as the battleground for the well known conflict berween
the Prime Minister and the Minister of Finance on economic
and social issues.
The members of the commission threatened to resign and
deliver the incomplete report in January 1988. The Prime
Minister personally intervened, and in a statement in February
disowned the tax reforms outlined by the Minister of Finance.
By then the commission had already lost much of its influence
and questions were raised in mass-media as to whether the
final report would have any impact at all.
It m~y he a long time before it is known what impact
the work of the Royal Commission will have on the New Zea-
land welfare state. The issues to be sorted out are not only
moral and political. There are also severe methodological pro-
blems involved in deciding what U the will of the ordinary peo-
ple" is. As the term of the commission was running out social
scientists from all over New Zealand were called upon to help
analyze the voluminous sets of data collected.
7. COlleluding remarks
While decentralization is being forwarded as one of the
major solutions to the serious problems most of the welfare
states are facing, this "solution" may neither be an adequate
nor a simple way of meeting the problems. This is brought
out when comparing different kinds of approaches to decen-
tralization in three small and fairly homogenous countries all
of which have a long tradition as welfare states.
Decentralization takes many forms as it incorporates a
number of variables which can enter into a multitude of dif-
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ferent constellations. The orwegian model is one of cflutiou
experimentation, broughr about in close cooperation between
the various administrative bodies and interested parties. This
is in accordance with the Norwegian tradition flfter the second
\Xforld War as that of a negotiating state (01 en. 198 : ch. 7).
The Danish model is a typical top-down approflch. initiated
by the central bureaucracy and ancrioned by fI Conservfltive
government which is furthering decentralization find debureau-
cratization in general. The lower administrativc le\'els fire being
bypas ed in the process as the e.,xperiment is Himed at incorpo-
rating the voices of the ordinary people, implying that deburcHu-
cratization may start at the local level. At this stHge it is too
early to predict the outcome of the project as nothing has been
decided neither concerning the analysis of the rcsults, nor the
possible administrative implementation of a decentralized strllc-
ture. The ew Zealand model is also a top-down approach.
initiated by the Labour party, and resisted by the bureHlIcracy
as well as other political bodies. This kind of decentralizat ion
was in the outset designed to become a bottom-up approach, but
when proved successful as such, was overtaken by powerful
political processes representing vested interests in the olltcome
of the feedback from the grassroots.
Characteristic for the three models above are the attempts
to serve several purposes at the the same time, some f which
are clearly incompatible and implying goals that are counteractive
to the social policy intentions which were the legitimating for e
behind decentralizing.. All the three countries are on the search
for a renewal of the weUare state. But they are also captives
of their previous history and the system of social programs
and professional groups developed to serve the welfare state.
Once established the social programs become a powcr base
of their own which are likely to resist change when their area
of responsibility is threatened. This resistance represents not
only a blocking of new reforms, but also a defence against a
general curtailment of rhe welfare state.
The interests of the state do only in part coincide wilh
those of the welfare state. Identifiable within the mature
capitalist state are contradictions which are reflected in the
evolution of the welfare state. Social programs are dcsi-
gned to bridge the problems inherent in the capitalist states,
bu t in their construction the programs always fall short of the
ideal solution, thereby incorporating the contradictions of the
state (Himmelsrrand, 1986). Decentralizing is an cxamplc of
a strategy trying to combine principles of extended democracy
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with the need for central control. So far no administrative
system has been created which can make any large scale patch-
work approach, or even the New Zealand experiment, survive
over time without fragmenting the power of the state or evo·
king conflicts between economic and social goals. If the
adversaries arc to be pacified it seems politically necessary that
the signj fjcance of the social programs be reduced proportion-
ally to the degree of decentralization implemented.
SuccessfuJJy introducing reforms in the public sector de-
pends on several factors, and the more comprehensive the
reform the less likely it is to succeed in accordance with the
original intentions (March and Olsen, 1983). Reforms in the
arena of social policy are likely to be even more difficult to
carry through. The mature welfare state has turned into one
of the most important institutions of redistribution, second
only to the labor market and the family. In some countries
social expenditures constitutes up to one third of all public
expenditures, one fifth of the populiation get their entire eco-
nomic support in benefits in cash, while many more receive
benefits in kind through institutional care, health services,
etc. Any attempt of decentraLization is a challenge to the
established pattern of distributing benefits and services, both
to the beneficiaries, as well as to the adminjstrative system and
the rest of the national economy. The implied political and
moral paradox is that the kind of decentralization which is
most likely to succeed is the sort which either maintains the
present distribution of benefits and services or favors those
groups that voice the strongest protests.
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